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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE I
Paul R. Baier*
I.

A.

ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE

WarrantlessArrest
(1) Probable Cause

Several opinions decided this term concern the validity of warrantless arrests. The cases turn on whether the arresting officer has
probable cause to believe the defendant committed an offense. Otherwise there is a violation of article 213(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and the state' and federal 2 constitutions as well. Defense
counsel always make the point in these cases that each of us, including the fellow caught red-handed, is supposed to be free from unreasonable seizures. A nice principle, but hardly ever does a defendant
benefit from its invocation and this term proved no exception. Either
there were enough facts to support a finding of probable cause, or
something less than probable cause was needed under article 215(1)
of the Code, 3 or the arrest itself produced no evidence sought to be
used against defendant at trial.' Once in a while though, in this area
of probable cause, the facts of a particular case were sufficient-better still, the facts were insufficient-to prick a member of
the court to dissent, especially Justice Barham. It seems he has taken
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. The stop and frisk section of the Code. See generally State v. Winesberry, 256
La. 523, 237 So. 2d 364 (1970), and see page 248 infra.
4. Although an arrest may be quite illegal and violate constitutional guarantees,
this is no defense to the criminal prosecution of an accused provided the illegal arrest
is unaccompanied by a seizure of evidence later sought to be used against the accused
at trial. Compare Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961). This doctrine, however, has been questioned where the police conduct in
making the arrest is flagrant. See Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures:
Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 16, 27-28 (1953). Whether the new constitution for
Louisiana, if ever adopted, would enable a defendant to complain at his criminal trial
about an illegal arrest unaccompanied by any seizure of evidence remains to be seen.
At least the language of the first enrollment's declaration of rights article dealing with
privacy, article I, § 5, suggests such a challenge would be possible: "Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have
standing to raise the illegality of that search or seizure in the appropriate court of law."
This express standing provision would be new to Louisiana law. Compare LA. CONST.
art. I, § 7. It may be, however, that the provision is only intended to adopt the rule of
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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to dissenting quite frequently, and across the entire spectrum of the
criminal process at that. Usually his work is an earmark that the case
deserves close attention, particularly in a survey like this.
State v. Mi~lsap5 is an easy case. Like all probable cause cases it
turns on an assessment of the facts known to the police officer at the
moment of apprehension. Millsap robbed a finance company at about
6:00 P.M. The victim described the robber and his clothes to the
investigating officer, and a radio bulletin to this effect was broadcast,
together with information that the car used in the robbery was a beige
VW with its license plate secured by only one bolt, hanging down to
the right. At 6:13 P.M. officers on patrol spotted the suspect vehicle
and attempted to stop it, but the car sped away until intercepted a
block later. There is no question but that all these facts combined
support the conclusion of probable cause. After all, there are not too
many beige VWs with their license plates hanging down to the right.
A gun and some loose currency discovered in Millsap's car after the
arrest were admissible at trial.
State v. Jones' is a much harder case. This time nothing is particularly remarkable about the vehicle involved: it's a U-Haul panel
truck. At about 3:00 A.M. in Shreveport a prowler is observed running from a newly constructed, unoccupied house. He enters the UHaul and drives slowly away. Minutes later, alerted by a radio dispatch, Officer Robertson follows the truck outside city limits and
when it stops at a gas station he asks for and is shown identification.
The officer inquires about the contents of the truck and is told it
contains air conditioners. Without opening the truck and using his
flashlight, Robertson peers through the truck's back window and observes two air conditioners partially covered by blankets. The units'
copper connections are sawed off. A radio call discloses that two units
were stolen from the area of the prowler incident by sawing off their
pipe connections. With this knowledge Robertson enters the truck
and seizes the air conditioners. At this point everyone leaves for the
Shreveport police station, but whether Jones is under arrest is unclear. At the station house the police discover the serial numbers on
the seized units match those reported stolen. Jones is formally arrested and advised of his rights.
Was Jones' warrantless arrest legal? That depends on when the
arrest occurred, whether at the gas or the police station. If the arrest
was at the gas station, it took place outside Shreveport city limits and
5. 274 So. 2d 696 (La. 1973).
6. 263 La. 164, 267 So. 2d 559 (1972).
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for that reason, Jones argued, it was illegal. This was not a case of
"hot pursuit," 7 since Officer Robertson could not reasonably have
believed Jones to have been involved in crime at the time he followed
the U-Haul out of Shreveport. The trial judge held the police had
probable cause to arrest Jones at the gas station for possession of
stolen property and that hence the evidence was seized pursuant to
a lawful arrest.' But clearly this theory is no good on the facts of the
case because, as Justice Barham pointed out in his dissent, "the
fallacy of this conclusion is that probable cause was acquired too late
under the factual sequence to authorize the search and seizure." ' In
other words, a bad arrest is never legitimated by what a search incident thereto turns up. Probable cause to arrest must always precede
the incidental search.
For the rest of the court, however, it was unnecessary to decide
when the arrest occurred since there was another way of looking at
the sequence of events. What the case really involved was an arrest
incident to a lawful search, not the other way around. The supreme
court held the police had probable cause to believe stolen air conditioners were contained in the truck and hence they were entitled to
search it even though defendant had not yet been arrested. Moreover,
since the case involved an automobile, special rules applied to permit
a search of the U-Haul without a warrant provided there was probable cause for the search.'" The court also found it unnecessary to
decide whether Officer Robertson's flashlight look into the rear win-

7. Act 646 of 1972 amended Code of Criminal Procedure article 213 so as to
authorize arrest in close pursuit into other jurisdictions. But under the amendment a
police officer must "be making an arrest pursuant to this article" when he follows in
close pursuit and leaves his jurisdiction. This proviso would seem to preclude application of the hot pursuit doctrine to stop and frisk investigative situations like the kind
involved in the Jones case.
Under an early opinion of the Louisiana Attorney General, one way for the police
to proceed on leaving their jurisdiction to make an arrest was to take the prisoner after
capturing him to the proper authorities in the parish in which the arrest was made.
See LA. ATT'Y GEN. OP. 152 (Apr. 1, 1938-Apr. 1, 1940). Something quite similar to this
happened this term in State v. Edgecombe, 275 So. 2d 740 (La. 1973), in which a St.
Bernard parish police officer lawfully pursued a suspect into New Orleans where the
arrest was made. The court rejected the contention that evidence seized incident to
defendant's arrest was inadmissible because the arrest was effected by a St. Bernard
parish policeman outside his jurisdiction. The court noted that the arrest was made
with the assistance of New Orleans policemen who were within their jurisdiction.
8. See State v. Jones, 263 La. 164, 171, 267 So. 2d 559, 562 (1972).
9. Id. at 182, 267 So. 2d at 566 (dissenting opinion).
10. The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause are in a class by themselves. See
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dow of the truck was an unreasonable search. It was not a search at
all-the officer merely observed what was in plain view."
In the writer's view the per curiam opinion in Jones is inadequate. The majority's rationale seems too neat, and decision in the
case comes too quickly. The opinion leaves a lot undecided and there
are important questions which need asking. Justice Barham's dissent, by way of contrast, seems to confront the case squarely. He is
not afraid to ask the hardest question of all: What right did Officer
Robertson, who was acting outside his jurisdiction, have to detain
Jones and his U-Haul at the gas station in the first instance? By what
authority did the police question Jones and what authorized Officer
Robertson to snoop into the back portion of the truck with his flashlight? Certainly not probable cause. It was Justice Barham's conclusion that, lacking jurisdiction for the detention and incidental scrutiny of the truck which established probable cause, the police could
2
neither arrest Jones nor seize the stolen air conditioners.'
Who was right in the case, and how should it have been decided?
Only Justice Barham mentioned article 215.1, the so-called "stop and
frisk" section of the Code. This approach seems right, for the case is
closer to the idea of police investigative pursuit on less than probable
cause, but more than naked hunch, than it is to probable cause seizure-either of the person'" or of evidence of crime. In the language
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971). The theory is that an automobile, unlike a house or other building,
may easily be spirited away if police officers are required to leave the scene and go
before a judge to obtain a warrant before searching the vehicle. See State v. McQueen,
278 So. 2d 114, 117 (La. 1973); State v. Jones, 263 La. 164, 171, 267 So. 2d. 559, 562
(1972).
11. State v. Jones, 263 La. 164, 173, 267 So. 2d 559, 563 (1972), citing United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), in which a boatswain using a search light discovered
cases of illegal liquor sitting in open view on the deck of a boat. "Such use of a
searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution." United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927).
For a general discussion of the "plain view" doctrine and its application to automobiles, see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) and especially Mr. Justice
Stewart's refined analysis in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See also
State v. Jackson, 263 La. 849, 856, 269 So. 2d 465, 467-68 (1972).
12. State v. Jones, 263 La. 164, 185, 267 So. 2d 559, 567 (1972) (dissenting
opinion).
13. The terminology of the fourth amendment and most state constitutions, including Louisiana's (art. I, § 7), uses the expression "seizure of the person" instead of
the more familiar "arrest" idea. But it is clear from this history of the amendment that
an illegal arrest is an illegal seizure of the person within the meaning of the amendment's language. See LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 79-82 (1937), cited in HALL, KAMISAR, LAFAVE
& ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 290-91 (1969).
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of article 215.1, it seems fair to say on the facts of the case that Officer
Robertson "reasonably suspect[ed]" that Jones and his U-Haul had
been involved in.crime. Flight from a newly constructed, unoccupied
building at 3:00 in the morning surely calls for police investigation.
Thus Officer Robertson was right to pick up the U-Haul panel truck
as it left Shreveport and follow it a few minutes after he had the
report of the prowler incident.
Under section A of article 215.1 it is clear that had Officer Robertson stopped the U-Haul on the spot, that is, inside Shreveport city
limits, he could have demanded of its driver "his name, address and
an explanation of his actions." But Jones gave his name, produced
identification, and explained that there were air conditioners in the
truck. A hard question is whether, at this point, the law required the
police to let Jones move on. What authorized Robertson's flashlight
look-crucial as it turned out-into the back window of the truck?
Reading article 215.1 strictly, there is nothing in any of its three
sections which allows this further investigation. The "frisk" authorized by section B only permits the pat-down of. a suspect's outer
clothing; 4 section B says nothing about frisking the vehicle driven by
a suspect. If the U-Haul involved in Jones had had no windows at all,
could Robertson have opened it up? Probably not. The majority opinion in the case is careful to point out that Robertson looked into the
back window "without opening the truck." 5 Even though the opinion
also emphasizes that the rules relating to warrantless searches are
different in cases involving moving vehicles," to broaden the "frisk"
concept of article 215.1 so as to allow a police officer to snoop for
evidence of crime concealed in a moving vehicle is to forget the fourth
amendment and defense counsel's admonition that individuals are
supposed to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
frisk authorized by section B finds constitutional vindication only in
the desire to protect the life and limb of policemen, not to uncover
evidence of possessory offenses on less than probable cause, and this
includes even evidence concealed in moving vehicles. 7 When Officer
14. "The limited search for dangerous weapons sanctioned in the Louisiana statute, as all searches in the absence of probable cause for arrest, must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation." Comment, 29 LA. L. REV. 523,
532 (1969).
15. State v. Jones, 263 La. 164, 169, 267 So. 2d 559, 561 (1972).
16. See note 10 supra.
17. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). ("The sole justification of the search in the
present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must
therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns,
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.") The
authority to frisk does not include the right to make "a general exploratory search for
whatever evidence of criminal activity [the officer] might find." Id. at 29-30. See also
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Robertson flashed his light into the back window of Jones' U-Haul,
what was he looking for? Nothing indicates he feared for his life.
Rather, his glance was probably meant to check out Jones' story that
air conditioners were being hauled; and it was only a fortuity that he
observed the sawed-off connections. The majority are quite right that
at this point there was probable cause to believe the air conditioners
were stolen. Jones had produced no evidence of ownership of the two
units nor had he established a right to the truck he was driving. But
the majority's application of the plain view doctrine at this point in
the sequence of events brushes over the delicate problem of Robertson's right to glance into the truck in the first instance.
It is possible however to treat the policeman's flashlight view into
Jones' vehicle as a concluding step in the investigative process authorized by article 215.1 of the Code. Even though not expressly
mentioned, an officer's quick glance into the windows of a stopped
vehicle to verify the driver's explanation of his actions is probably
only natural anyway and within the intent of the Code."' Moreover,
the law ought not to force policemen to close their eyes to what is
plainly there to be seen nor should it prescribe the kind of natural
investigative step that is involved when an officer glances into the
windows of a vehicle whose driver is "reasonably suspect[ed]" of
involvement in crime. But no more. Otherwise what is a delicate
balance of reasonableness would be tilted the wrong way. If the blanket in Jones' U-Haul had covered the tell-tale pipe connections and
if Robertson's call to the stationhouse had not alerted him to the fact
that two air conditioners had been stolen in the area of the prowler
incident, Jones would have been legally free to go. To reiterate the
root metaphor, so long as the curtains are drawn even the criminal
suspect is entitled to his privacy. Our supreme court should carefully
avoid too expansive a reading of the stop and frisk section of the
Code. But sloughing off the question in the name of plain view is no
answer either. With all deference, the majority in Jones should have
at least tested the validity of Officer Robertson's conduct against the
Comment, 29 LA. L. REv. 523, 532-34 (1969).
18. Section A of article 215.1 provides that after stopping a person an officer may
demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions. This provision
was probably not written with moving vehicles in mind, but there is no good reason
for not allowing a police officer to stop a car reasonably suspected of involvement in
crime; the driver and passengers could then be questioned pursuant to the express
provisions of section A. Once a car is lawfully stopped, an officer's flashlight look
around would seem to facilitate the section's investigative purpose. Cf. State v.
McQueen, 278 So. 2d 114 (La. 1973). Thus, such conduct should be held within the
authority impliedly granted police officers under article 215.1A of the Code.
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provisions of article 215.1.11
State v. McLeod" is another troublesome case. For all that appears in the report, a state trooper stopped a car near Lafayette on
the strength of a radio report that "three white males out of New
Orleans were wanted for a criminal act" and because a passenger in
the car appeared "slouched down as if hiding" to the trooper.', These
two facts alone are hardly sufficient to constitute probable cause for
an arrest."z Moreover, nothing about the car involved was unique in
any way. But as it turned out, stopping the car was indeed fortunate
because after the stop and after orderingthe occupants out of the car,
the officer noticed that a passenger fit the description of one of the
wanted men. And this official detention gave the driver of the car just
enough time to blurt out that he had been kidnapped and that his
captor had a gun in his shirt, all of which was quite true. However
defense counsel argued there was no probable cause to arrest defendant at the time the gun was taken from him and that, therefore, the
seizure was invalid and inadmissible in evidence against defendant
at his trial.
The supreme court rejected this contention. At the time of the
seizure, the police were "armed"-to use the court's own felicitous
19. One problem remains in the Jones case. What about the fact that the Shreveport police officer was outside city limits when he completed his investigation of
suspected crime? Was Jones' arrest illegal for want of jurisdiction? The majority answers no, treating Officer Robertson as a private person under article 214 of the Code.
A felony was in fact committed and the arresting officer, albeit outside his jurisdiction
at the gas station, had probable cause to believe Jones was in possession of stolen
property. See State v. Jones, 263 La. 164, 174, 267 So. 2d 559, 563 (1972). In the present
writer's view, Justice Barham is right in his dissent when he states that it is a mistake
to equate a police officer with a private individual for purposes of an arrest analysis.
That there are significant differences is also well expressed in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Narcotics Bureau, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971). But still,
the majority's result on this point in Jones seems correct. The court might have added
that even an illegal arrest, without more, traditionally is no cause for voiding the
prosecution of defendant. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
20. 271 So. 2d 45 (La. 1973).
21. Id. at 47.
22. But cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (dissenting opinion,
Jackson, J.): "If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnapped and the officers
throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be
a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might be unable to show
probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard
to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be
reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a
threatened life and detect a vicious crime."
Nothing in the McLeod case, however, suggests that the police had set up a
roadblock or that they knew that the driver of the car had been kidnapped.
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phrase-not only with guns, but with enough facts to arrest defendant on probable cause and, in turn, to disarm him. Therefore the
search and seizure were incidental to a valid arrest.13 While at first
blush this conclusion seems wholly sound, the question remains:
What about the initial stop itself? By what authority is a state
trooper allowed to stop cars in Lafayette merely because of a report
of criminal acts in New Orleans? If the legitimacy of defendant's
arrest and seizure of the gun is tested against a different contention,
specifically, that a state trooper has no business stopping a car simply
because a passenger appears slouched down as if hiding, the result
in the case might well have been different. McLeod, then, is a case
which proves that how one comes out in legal argument often depends
on where one begins. From the report, it appears defense counsel
began his argument too late in the sequence of events, 4 and just like
the situation in the Jones case, it seems counsel and the court in
McLeod missed another chance to apply Louisiana's stop and frisk
legislation. In the writer's view, application of article 215.1 of the
Code to the facts of both these cases would have produced a more
genuine assessment of the legality of the police investigative techniques employed.
(2) Stop and Frisk, Article 215.1
Mention of Louisiana's stop and frisk legislation, article 215.1 of
the Code, rarely appears in the supreme court's opinions. 5 This may
only indicate the provision is working well in the field. Police investigation pursuant to the article may clear a number of suspects who
thereafter never have the chance to make the appellate reports. Or
another explanation is that enough facts may accumulate during the
investigative process to provide probable cause for an outright arrest
of the suspect. However article 215.1 did make it to the surface of the
opinion in one case decided during the survey period, State v.
6
Williams."
This time defense counsel was careful to pinpoint his
argument so as to require the court to consider the validity of the stop
involved in the case. The facts are these: A grocery store is robbed
by a young man wearing a brown hat and an eyewitness gets a good
look at him. Three days later the police have a report that the defen23. State v. McLeod, 271 So. 2d 45, 47 (1973).
24. Cf. State v. Jones, 263 La. 164, 267 So. 2d 559 (1972).
25. So far as this writer can determine, since the article's enactment in 1968 it
has been referred to only three times by the court. State v. Williams, 262 La. 317, 263
So. 2d 306 (1972); State v. Amphy, 259 La. 161, 249 So. 2d 560 (1971); State v.
Winesberry, 256 La. 523, 237 So. 2d 364 (1970).
26. 262 La. 317, 263 So. 2d 306 (1972).
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dant Williams took a radiator from his father. The police see defendant walking on Scenic Highway, accompanied by two boys, carrying
a radiator. They take Williams and his two companions to headquarters where it is learned that the radiator was not stolen. The two boys
are released. Meanwhile at the station an investigation reveals that
a wanted bulletin is out for defendant; he is detained; the eyewitness
identifies him at a station house line-up; and thereafter defendant is
charged with robbery of the grocery store.
What about defense counsel's argument that this identification
and the brown hat taken from defendant as evidence of crime at the
police station are inadmissible at trial as fruits of Williams' illegal
stop and arrest on the Scenic Highway? This theory, if accepted,
would seem to preclude prosecuting the defendant for any offense
that routine checking at the police station might turn up so long as
the defendant's illegal arrest and presence at the station house stirred
the police to further investigative inquiry. 7 From the facts, it appears
the wanted bulletin out on defendant was for the very robbery involved in the case. This bulletin was based on the.eyewitness' tentative identification of the defendant as the robber from a photograph
shown to her immediately after commission of the offense. In these
circumstances, to bar defendant's prosecution for robbery on account
of an allegedly illegal arrest for another unconnected offense is too
high a price to pay even conceding the illegality of the initial stop or
arrest. Justice Sanders' concurring opinion in Williams makes this
quite clear:
Assuming that the pickup whereby defendant was brought to
Police Headquarters was an illegal arrest, as defendant contends,
that custodial action passed out of the picture after he was arrested at Headquarters under the pickup bulletin. The line-up
and seizure were accomplished by virtue of the headquarters arrest, not by 'exploitation' of the challenged arrest. Hence, the
line-up identification and demonstrative evidence are un2
tainted. 1
Justice Sanders' special concurrence is an important addition to the
Williams case; his opinion is a commendable piece of work even if it
does moot the law prof's inquiry: Was there anything illegal in picking Williams and his young friends up and taking them to police
headquarters without a warrant? Still, an answer to that question is
27. Compare the facts in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
28. State v. Williams, 262 La. 317, 341-42, 263 So. 2d 306, 314 (1972) (concurring
opinion), citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
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warranted here, especially in a survey like this, where the effort is
always to guide judgments just around the corner of the reports towards keeping a reasoned balance-and not necessarily equipoise either-between the public's protection and the accused's. Achieving
that end requires that we keep exactly what it is we're doing in mind
in each case. Hobbes' advice is as good for criminal procedure as it
is for jurisprudence.29
Williams' counsel argued that there was not the slightest reason
for stopping defendant "except that [Williams] was one of three
young blacks walking down the street in broad daylight." 0 This is not
quite true because the police had been notified of the theft of a
radiator, and a defendant and his friends were carrying one when
discovered on Scenic Highway. Whether at this point the police had
probable cause to arrest Williams or his companions is hard to say.
Very little appears in the opinion connecting Williams and his friends
to the reported theft. Yet there is almost nothing inherently suspicious about a group of young boys carrying a radiator on a public
street in broad daylight. Some young people simply like to tinker with
cars. And what about the fellow, maybe even Justice Barham-to use
his own example"-who is carrying his TV into the shop for repairs.
Lots of television sets are stolen, but that is hardly enough reason to
say that any individual carrying one, or even Williams with his radiator, probably stole it. Thus on the facts there seems to be no excuse
for arresting either Williams or his companions if indeed that is what
happened. For the majority, Justice Hamlin rejected Williams' argument as follows:
When the police officers saw three boys carrying a radiator along
the public highway, they became suspicious of the boys. We find
that the suspicion was justified. . . .We also find that the officers actions were justified at their inception and were reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances. The officers certainly had
a right to interfere with the boys' activities; they had a right to
question them under LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 215.1. . . .Defendant
and his two companions, as stated supra, were taken to police
29. In his Leviathan Hobbes tells his reader how he should "regulate" his "Trayne
of Thoughts"; that is, what we should do "in case our thoughts begin to wander."
Hobbes' prescription is that we should always keep in mind the problem we are trying
to solve. He concludes with a general admonition: "in all your actions, look often upon
what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain
it." Quoted in L. FULLER, THE LAW INQUEST OF ITSELF 1 (1940).
30. State v. Williams, 262 La. 317, 323, 263 So. 2d 306, 308 (1972).
31. Cf. State v. McQueen, 278 So. 2d 114, 120-21 (La. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
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headquarters; they accompanied the officers voluntarily; there
was no arrest.Information at police headquarters revealed prior
suspicious activities of defendant, and it was only after apprehension on the highway and the voluntary trip to police headquarters
that defendant was arrested. At the time of arrest, police had
probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a crime.
Defendant was therefore not the victim of illegal arrest.32
Clearly Justice Hamlin is right to hold the police had authority to
question Williams and his friends under" section A of article 215.1 of
the Code and to demand an explanation from them. The theory of
this section is that something less than probable cause is needed to
"stop" a suspect because the restraint involved is minimal, requiring
the individual to give only his name, address and to explain his
actions. But on the same theory the police should never be allowed
under the article to switch the locus of the investigation from the
street to the police station save either extraordinary circumstances or
probable cause to arrest. Moreover, the court should be slow to hold
even voluntary removal to the police station legitimate under section
215.1(A). The risk of an unintelligent waiver of constitutional rights
is too great. Indeed, where there is no probable cause to arrest, it
might not be a bad rule to preclude consent altogether as an excuse
for removing a suspect from the street and taking him to the police
station for further investigation. This would avoid the recurring and
troublesome problem of proof of consent. It would also moot the
sticky problem of what to do if the victim of the crime happens to be
at the station house and identifies the suspect as he is brought in for
investigative questioning. This almost happened in Williams.3 If it
ever does, Justice Sanders will surely have to reshape his concurring
opinion. If probable cause comes after the line-up identification and
not before, the issue of a suspect's knowing consent and especially the
task of reasoned application of the fruits doctrine will be hard indeed.
B.

Search and Seizure
(1) Search Warrants

Three cases this term are important for what they say about
issuance of search warrants, which in Louisiana "may issue only upon
probable cause established to the satisfaction of the judge, by the
32. State v. Williams, 262 La. 317, 326, 263 So. 2d 306, 308-09 (1972).
33. Williams was identified at a line-up, but this took place after defendant's
arrest. Id. at 327, 263 So. 2d at 309.
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affidavit of a credible person, reciting facts establishing the cause for
issuance of the warrant."34 But probable cause as to what? The notion
of probable cause to arrest means there are good reasons for suspecting a particular accused's guilt. So too, probable cause for a search
warrant means there is a connection in all probability between the
items sought under the warrant and crime. But probable cause in this
latter context means more. The idea is two dimensional. For a search
warrant to issue, the supporting affidavit must also show there is good
reason for believing the items sought will be found in the specific
place to be searched at the time the warrant is issued. There is no
comparable requirement on issuance of an arrest warrant; a suspect
can be sought out and arrested anywhere in the state. 35 This is an
important distinction which is sometimes overlooked in cases. For
instance, the affidavit in State v. Bastida38 clearly establishes enough
cause on its face for believing Bastida robbed his victim on April 7
using an automatic pistol as his weapon. But is a search warrant good
which issues ten days later authorizing a search of Bastida's residence
for automatic weapons? That depends on whether there is any good
reason for thinking Bastida would keep weapons at his home. The
affidavit suggests that Bastida was a narcotics addict who used the
proceeds of the robbery to purchase heroin.37 On these facts the conclusion of the court seems reasonable:
[T]he warrant was properly issued to search for the automatic
weapons used in the armed robbery. It is true that the robbery
occurred April 7, the detective received the information from his
informant on April 8, and the warrant issued when applied for on
April 17. The time lag might have affected the issuance for a
narcotics search or even to search for the stolen money. Nevertheless, there was a reasonable inference from the affidavit, and
probable cause to issue the warrant to search defendant's house
for automatic weapons used in the robbery.38
But the warrant actually issued in the case was not limited to seizure
of automatic weapons; the list of items capturable under the warrant
34. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 162.
35. An arrest warrant "may be executed in any parish by any peace officer having
authority in the territorial jurisdiction where the person arresfed is found .
LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 204.
36. 271 So. 2d 854, 855 (La. 1973).
37. See State v. St. Amand, 274 So. 2d 179 (La. 1973), in which the court took
judicial notice of the fact that: "It is almost axiomatic today that most armed robberies
are associated with drug addicts trying to obtain funds to sustain their grim appetites."
Id. at 192.
38. State v. Bastida, 271 So. 2d 854, 855-56 (La. 1973).
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was much broader. Accordingly, as Justice Barham saw it, this warrant was too broad and all-inclusive; it exceeded the scope of the
supporting affidavit's showing of probable cause." For this reason
Justice Barham dissented. What does not appear in the case, however, is just what evidence was admitted at trial over Bastida's objection. If the gun used in the robbery was all that was admitted, then
the breadth of the warrant, even if error, seems harmless. Without
more information, it is impossible to say who was right in the case.
Justice Barham's dissent, in other words, is not full enough.
Such is not the case in State v. Hightower,40 however. In that
case, Justice Barham's dissent is masterful: he sifts through the
cases, snatching out good thinking; and his conclusion comes in four
crisp pages, leaving one with the reasoned conviction that the majority is wrong. The case involves seizure of marijuana nine days after
the police witness the sale of a lid out of defendant's apartment.
Some hashish is also sold from an adjacent apartment sixteen days
before the police swear out the warrant. Nothing else appears in the
supporting affidavit except the fact that the occupants of both apartments are close associates and visit each other regularly.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress for
the reason that nothing in the affidavit established probable cause to
believe there was marijuana in defendant's apartment at the time the
warrant was issued. The state's application for writs was granted and
the supreme court reversed. The majority held that the nine days
which had elapsed between the date of the alleged sale of marijuana
and issuance of the search warrant did not constitute such remoteness of time as to leave the probable cause recited in the affidavit
stale and inadequate. Chief Justice Hamlin relied on article 163 of
the Code which allows ten days for the execution of a search warrant
and thus, it was said, the delay in the case was "within the contemplated legal limitation."'"
It should be noted, however, that article 163 relates to delay after
issuance of the warrant, not before the application, although the
rationale of the provision, that sometimes probable cause is vitiable
owing to the lapse of time, is applicable in either event. It is interesting that no mention at all was made of the court's dictum in Bastida
that a time lag may very well affect the issuance of a search warrant
where narcotics are involved," the very point at issue in the
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 857 (dissenting opinion).
272 So. 2d 363 (La. 1973).
Id. at 356.
See State v. Bastida, 271 So. 2d 854, 856 (La. 1973) (dictum).
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Hightower case. In this writer's view, the theory of the dissent in
Hightower makes good sense. Without a showing in the affidavit that
the apartment involved is the source of continuing drug traffic, there
is no cause for believing marijuana to be there nine days after affiants
observe what for all that appears is one isolated sale.4" The fact that
article 163 allows ten days for execution of a search warrant is not
conclusive either. When the question is whether probable cause exists
anterior to issuance of the warrant, the article should be considered
only for what it is worth, a rough guidepost. Moreover, the fourth
amendment would seem to preclude holding the presumption of
staleness incorporated in article 163 irrebuttable as against the defendant. Finally, the language of the article speaks only to the police; it
sets up a bright line which seems to apply exclusively to law enforcement officers.
One more case on search warrants; and something on the vagaries of judicial dicta. On the surface there is nothing unusual about
State v. George.44 Its twin, State v. Anselmo,4 5 is already in the jurisprudence. Anselmo holds that probable cause for issuing a search
warrant is to be adjudged on the face of the supporting affidavit itself;
the truthfulness vel non of facts supplied by a confidential informer
cannot later be attacked at a suppression hearing. But Louisiana may
well be moving toward the rule that allows collateral attack if the
claim is that the affiant, mainly police officers, and not the confidential informer lied.46 Why else the dictum in this term's George case:
43. State v. Hightower, 272 So. 2d 363, 370 (La. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
44. 273 So. 2d 34 (La. 1973).
45. 260 La. 306, 256 So. 2d 98 (1971).
46. At least 5 states now permit defendant to challenge the facts upon which the
warrant issues. Theodore v. Superior Ct., 104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234 (1972);
O'Bean v. State, 184 So. 2d 635 (Miss. 1966); State v. Baca, 84 N.M. 513, 505 P.2d
856 (1973) (dictum); People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 644 (1965); Commonwealth v. Hall, 541 Pa. 201, 302 A.2d 342 (1973). The-leading federal cases allowing
impeachment of the affiant are United States v. Ramos, 380 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967);
King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960); United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d
318 (7th Cir. 1960). The United States Supreme Court has never resolved the question
whether the fourth amendment requires that the accused be given a chance to attack
the truthfulness of the facts alleged in the affidavit for a search warrant. The court
expressly reserved the question in Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
Professor Forkosh has the best and most recent scholarship in this area. He concludes
that in fourth amendment warrant searches and seizures the facts should be subject
to questioning and where a slight preliminary showing so indicates the affiant permitted to be attacked on truthfulness and credibility, with some form of pretrial adversary
proceeding and with a yes-or-no determination of probable cause stemming from the
whole record thus created. See Forkosh, The ConstitutionalRight to Challenge the
Content of Affidavits in Warrants Issued under the FourthAmendment, 34 Omo ST.
L.J. 297, 340 (1973).
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"The defendant did not allege in the motion to suppress that the
police officer had knowingly recited false statements to the Houma
city courts in his application for the search warrant."47
For Justice Summers the court's side utterance was too much to
take; he wrote specially in the case, protesting that the majority
seemed "inadvertently or otherwise" to put too restrictive an interpretation on the Anselmo holding."' It is interesting that earlier on
though, in the Anselmo case itself, it was Justice Summers who wrote
for the court, and his opinion included lots of dicta to the effect that
even an affiant's veracity was beyond collateral impeachment." At
that time the protests about "the wisdom of incorporating so much
dicta as to matters not at issue"5 0 were all on the other side, in special
concurring opinions from Justices Tate and Barham. Now, with
George out, it seems we have come full circle. The case is important
because it is not really Anselmo's twin at all; it's more a mirror image,
with the judges and their dicta reversed. Moreover, it is probably
significant that Justice Dixon, who took no part in Anselmo, authored
the George opinion. His views are now known and there are at least
3 votes for holding the affiant's veracity subject to collateral attack.
It will be interesting to see whether, indeed, the dictum in George
proves more advertent than otherwise. This writer would not be surprised. If so, there is much to learn about the judicial process in all
of this.
(2) Warrantless Search and Seizure
Evidence of crime "in plain view," as the cases say, is subject to
seizure without a search warrant provided the view itself is lawful-that is, the police have a right to be on the premises or at the

47. State v. George, 273 So. 2d 34, 36 (La. 1973) (dictum).
48. Id. at 37 (concurring opinion).
49. See State v. Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 313, 256 So. 2d 98, 101-04 (1971) (dictum).
50. Id. at 324, 256 So. 2d at 105 (Tate, J., concurring).
51. More than likely in the vast majority of cases any evidence seized by the police
will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure. But what is required under
the "plain view" doctrine is something different: "What the 'plain view' cases have in
common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused-and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may
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location from which the view derives." In State v. DiBartolo,52 officers
broke into a New Orleans apartment house by removing a screen from
a window; they suspected narcotics traffic, but there was no probable
cause either to arrest anyone or to search the building. Unfortunately
for the defendant, at the same time the police entered, he left his
apartment unit and entered a common hallway carrying narcotics
paraphernalia. He was immediately arrested and searched. Heroin
was on his person and he was charged with its possession. Was the
heroin admissible at trial?
The majority, Justice Barham writing, held no. While the police
had a right to investigate the premises, they had no business breaking
into the apartment house; the officers' action in illegally entering the
locked building clearly tainted their subsequent observations, making the arrest and seizure incident thereto illegal.53 In other words
while defendant was plainly in the hallway, the police had no right
to the view. Moreover, the idea that defendant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hallway was rejected by the court.
On the facts of the case the majority refused to treat the common
hallway as a public area. Chief Justice Sanders' conclusion was just
the opposite: "In the hall of the apartment building, there could be
no reasonable expectation on [defendant's] part of freedom from
governmental intrusion." 4 So, for the dissenters55 the fact that the
officers illegally entered the building's common hallway was irrelevant; there was no violation of this defendant's fourth amendment
rights.5" To the writer the idea that the police can break into a buildnot be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
466 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, J.). See also note 11 supra.
52. 276 So. 2d 291 (La. 1973).
53. Id. at 294.
54. Id. at 296 (dissenting opinion).
55. Chief Justice Hamlin and Justice Summers also dissented without opinion.
56. Dissenting Justice Sanders stated: "In this case, the presence of the officers
in the apartment house hallway violated no right of privacy of the defendant." Id. at
297 (dissenting opinion). But the majority rejected the idea that DiBartolo had no
standing to challenge the police illegality in the case. The fact that he was a guest and
not a tenant of the apartment unit did not affect his right to challenge the legality of
the officers' actions in breaking into the apartment house since any person legitimately
on premises where a search occurs has standing to challenge the validity of the search.
Id. at 294 n.3, citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
The first enrollment of the proposed new constitution for Louisiana expressly
adopts the Jones rationale. The proposed declaration of rights article includes a privacy section, article I, § 5, which states: "Any person adversely affected by a search
or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise the illegality of that search or seizure in the appropriate court of law." This standing provision
is new. Compare with LA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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ing and still claim the public's view is a contradiction in terms. The
better conclusion in DiBartolo seems to be the majority's. Moreover,
it is not stretching the fourth amendment to say that a tenant who
has to use the hallway to reach the bathroom and who knows the
building is kept locked and that only tenants have keys 7 probably has
a reasonable expectation that when he enters the hallway he is safe
from governmental intrusion. Defendant was hardly carrying his narcotics paraphernalia in plain view in the lobby of Le Pavillon Hotel.
(3) Consent to Search
That the defendant "consented" is often relied on by the police
to justify a search where there is no probable cause either for a search
warrant or for an arrest." Such is the case in State v. Pitts.5 9 Moreover
the case holds a suspect need not be told specifically of the right to
refuse consent. For the writer this seems too risky. Without telling a
suspect he has the right to refuse consent, the likelihood of an unintelligent waiver of the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures is significantly increased. 0 How can there be an "intentional
57. The majority in DiBartolo relied on these facts in support of the conclusion
that defendant's expectation of privacy in the hallway was reasonable. State v. DiBartolo, 276 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. 1973).
58. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624 (1946); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
"The 'consent search' is frequently relied upon by the police because it involves
no time-consuming paper work and it offers an opportunity to search where probable
cause, either for a search warrant or for an arrest, is lacking." TIFFANY, MCINTYRE, &
ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 156 (1967), quoted in HALL, KAMISAR, LAFAVE, &
ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 291-92 (1969).
59. 263 La. 38, 267 So. 2d 186 (1972).
60. The writer is thus in agreement with the dissenting views of Mr. Justice
Marshall in Schneckloth v.Bustamonte, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2073 (1973) (dissenting opinion): "I would have thought that the capacity to choose necessarily depends upon
knowledge that there is a choice to be made. But today the Court reaches the curious
result that one can choose to relinquish a constitutional right-the right to be free from
unreasonable searches-without knowing that he has the alternative of refusing to
accede to a police request to search. I cannot agree, and therefore dissent."
Moreover, the writer would have thought that requiring the police to inform the
subject of a search that he has the right to refuse consent is a sensible and practical
solution to the problem. But see the majority position. Id. at 2043.
Even after Schneckloth, however, it remains to be seen whether courts will require
the officers who conducted the consent search to testify at trial that they informed
defendant of his right to refuse consent. This is different from requiring the prosecution
to prove that defendant knew he had a right to refuse the search, although the two
requirements are related. What troubled the court in Schneckloth was the difficult
burden of proof the state would have to meet if it were obliged to prove the subjective
state of defendant's mind. This would not be true if all that were required would be
affirmative testimony from the searching officers that they informed defendant of his
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relinquishment or abandonment of a known right"'" without telling
the 'defendant something about the fourth amendment, especially
that it includes the right to refuse an otherwise unconstitutional
search? But the law in Louisiana is clearly the other way, 2 and the
United States Supreme Court just last term in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte63 settled the question in favor of Louisiana's position.
Failure to advise the defendant of his right to withhold consent is only
one factor among others to be considered. And in Pitts our own supreme court added what usually appears in these consent cases:
Under the facts as they appear in the transcripts we cannot disagree with the trial judge's conclusion that the search was made
with the consent of the defendant, though she may not have been
told specifically that she could refuse to be searched. The factual
determination of the trial court regarding the validity of the consent should be given great weight, and it will not be disturbed on
review unless clearly erroneous. 4
While all of this makes sense in cases like Pitts, where the suspect
has something to gain by consenting to the search,65 what reason other
fourth amendment rights. For the writer, requiring the police to testify at trial that
they informed defendant of his right to refuse consent to the search seems a reasonable
accommodation of the interests at stake. While this approach would introduce problems of proof of its own, (see note 68 infra) at least it would require the officers
who conducted the search to swear at trial that they told defendant he could refuse
the search. This would avoid the possibility of what Professor Fuller has ingeniously
depicted as the infliction of injustice by the elbows, and not with fists. See L. FULLER,
TtiE MORALITY OF LAW 159 (1964): "[Mlost of the world's injustices are inflicted, not
with fists, but with the elbows. When we use our fists we use them for a definite
purpose, and we are answerable to others and to ourselves for that purpose."
61. The reference is to the holding in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938),
that waiver of counsel, to be effective, must be an intentional relinquishment of a
known right. While the Johnson case involved the right to counsel, Professor Tigar has
suggested that the waiver theory enunciated in Johnson is applicable to other constitutional rights as well, including fourth amendment protection. See Tigar, Waiver of
ConstitutionalRights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1970). But a majority of the United States Supreme Court has refused to apply the Johnson rule to the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973).
62. State v. Andrus, 250 La. 765, 199 So. 2d 867 (1967).
63. 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973).
64. State v. Pitts, 263 La. 38, 41-42, 267 So. 2d 186, 187-88 (1972).
65. In Pitts, the defendant attempted to smuggle drugs for her husband into the
State Penitentiary at Angola. Prison authorities asked to search her and she agreed;
the drugs were found secreted away in what appeared to be two new packages of
cigarettes.
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than "peaceful submission to a presumed lawful request"" is there
for thinking a suspect would allow a search of his person or his house
where the search is destined to turn up incriminating evidence? 7 In
such circumstances the very idea that any defendant would consent
to an otherwise unlawful search seems to defy human experience. An
obvious fact of life cuts the other way. Unless coerced, a suspect with
red hands will always try to keep them in his pockets. At the least,
then, the court should keep this fact in mind when it reviews the
validity of defendant's consent to a search without probable cause."
II.

A.

PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION

PhotographicIdentification

There is nothing unusual about an eyewitness identifying defendant as the perpetrator of a crime from photographs shown to the
eyewitness during the investigative stage of the criminal process. The
technique of photographic identification is widely used and effective
in criminal law enforcement; sometimes it is the only quick way the
police have to pinpoint their investigation against a specific suspect.
And, despite the hazards of initial identification of defendant by
photograph, the United States Supreme Court has approved the
66. State v. Amphy, 259 La. 161, 174, 249 So. 2d 560, 565 (1971).
67. The federal courts generally are wary of claims of waiver or consent in these
circumstances. See, e.g., Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951). And in
United States v. Shropshire, 271 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1967), the court declared it
incredible that a suspect who denied his guilt would have consented to a search which
he knew would disclose incriminating evidence.
68. For example, in another consent case decided this term, State v. Crothers, 278
So. 2d 12 (La. 1973), a police officer "was admitted" into a house by the defendant
after the officer knocked at the door of the house to investigate the report of a disturbance. Once inside, the officer recognized the smell of marijuana and seized a water pipe
and its contents which were in plain view. This evidence was admitted at trial over
defendant's objection and the supreme court affirmed for the reason that "we have
found that the evidence supports the trial judge's conclusion that [the officer] was
" Id. at 15. But just what does it mean
admitted to the house by the defendant ....
that the policeman "was admitted" by the defendant? There is no suggestion in the
case that defendant "voluntarily consented" to the officer's entry. Yet this, and not
the fact of actual physical entry, is the crucial issue in the case. Surely it is fair to ask,
why would any defendant whose house is full of marijuana in plain view agree to allow
a police officer to take a look around unless on the officer's claim of right? With all
deference to the court, that the officer "was admitted" to the house is irrelevant. What
the Crothers case really asks is a different question entirely; that is, is appellate review
really adequate in a case like Crothers when the reviewing court routinely affirms on
the ground that a police officer testified "defendant consented" at the suppression
hearing? Space hardly allows an adequate analysis of that question here.
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practice against constitutional challenge provided the "photographic
identification procedure was [not] so impermissibly suggestive as to
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."" What this means is that a suspect who is identified by
photograph before a trial can later claim as defendant that the witness' conclusion at trial "this is the man" derives from the pretrial
procedures used to identify him rather than from the witness' own
independent recollection of the criminal episode. 0 Whether defendant's claim is good depends on all of the circumstances and "each
7
case must be considered on its own facts." '
On the facts in State v. Mitchell,7 2 the court rejected defendant's
contention that he had been misidentified at trial owing to an impermissibly suggestive pretrial photographic identification. The maintenance man of an apartment building that was burglarized gave the
police a description of a stranger he saw in the building's parking lot
on the afternoon of the burglary. A week or so later this eyewitness
identified defendant from his picture as the stranger, but the identification procedure used was less than ideal because only one photograph of the defendant was shown to the witness. This practice car69. Simmons
tive photographic
of'
law; there can
array, even if the

v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). The problem of suggesidentification of the accused is, of course, a problem of due process
be no claim of a right to counsel at a photographic identification
array is post-indictment. See United States v. Ash, 93 S. Ct. 2568

(1973).

70. The independent source test was articulated in United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 240 (1967), and Gilbert v. California,388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967). These cases
require that, to be admissible, an in-court identification must have a source other than
a pretrial confrontation at which an attorney was impermissibly absent. The principle
has been applied by analogy to pretrial confrontations in violation of due process under
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
Defense counsel might also challenge the admissibility of the photographic identification itself, if the state relies on it at trial, as well as the witness' in-court identification of the defendant. Whether the test for determining the admissibility of the incourt identification and the extrajudicial, pretrial identification are the same remains
to be seen. For pre-Stovall cases, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
tests are the same. See Neil v. Biggers, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972). Just what the court will
hold for post-Stovall cases is unclear. Compare Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d
1230 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (en banc) with United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d
912 (2d Cir. 1970). One federal court of appeals has held that in post-Stovall cases,
the need to deter police from using less reliable identification procedures when more
dependable means are available mandates barring evidence of unnecessarily suggestive
confrontations regardless of evidence of an independent source. See Smith v. Coiner,
473 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973). See generally Note, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1973).
71. Neil v. Biggers, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
384 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
72. 278 So. 2d 48 (La. 1973)
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ries with it a powerfully suggestive thought: the police suspect this
man; and the thought is conveyed even if nothing express passes
between the police and the witness. Surely the procedure used in
Mitchell was suggestive, but the supreme court decided it was not
impermissibly so because the record in the case fairly indicated the
witness' trial identification derived from a source independent of the
photograph.73 The witness had had a good opportunity to see the
stranger on the afternoon of the burglary, and as a result he probably
identified the defendant from his picture not because it was the only
one displayed, but because it depicted the right man.
The result in Mitchell seems correct if one is satisfied that there
was an independent basis for the witness' courtroom identification of
defendant. And certainly the facts set out by the court tend in that
direction. But one can never be sure of this conclusion when only one
photograph is used for pretrial identification, and no excuse at all
appears in the case for the police not including three or four other
photographs along with defendant's so as to avoid the chance of misidentification.14
State v. Edgecombe75 is another photographic identification
case. The case is important to practitioners because it seems to answer a very important strategic question: when and how can defense
counsel contest the validity of pretrial photographic identification
procedures?
Three rape victims all identified defendant at trial as their assailant. One of the victims prepared a composite picture of her assailant on the eve of the offense and it was this picture, together with
the victim's detailed description of the rapist and his automobile,
which finally led police to apprehend the defendant three months and
two rapes later. At the bail hearing the same victim who prepared the
composite picture was shown a group of mug shots and she picked out
defendant's picture as that of her attacker. Before trial, defense counsel requested discovery of all photographs of the defendant and of
others shown to the victims which produced defendant's pretrial
73. But see note 70 supra.
74. In Neil v. Biggers, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972), the court acknowledged the possibility
that unnecessary suggestiveness alone might require the exclusion of pretrial identification of' the accused. The purpose of a strict rule barring evidence of unnecessarily
suggestive confrontations would be to deter the police from using a less reliable procedure when a more reliable one is available. But the court did not reach the question
because both the identification confrontation and the trial in the Biggers case preceded
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), in which the court first announced that the
suggestiveness of confrontation procedures is not simply a matter for jury argument
and that pretrial identification procedures are subject to judicial control.
75. 275 So. 2d 740 (La. 1973).
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identification. This seems a natural step to take in preparation for
trial. How else can defense counsel decide whether to file a motion
to suppress identification testimony or whether it would be strategic
at trial to attack the victim's identification on cross-examination by
showing taint? Furthermore, counsel's request in Edgecombe was
supported by one of the more important objectives of pretrial discovery, that is, to surface and dispose of potential constitutional problems at an early date."6 How can defense counsel assert that the
defendant's photographic identification was impermissibly suggestive without at least knowing the number of mug shots used and what
the pictures looked like? But the supreme court unanimously affirmed, treating counsel's request as if it were one for tangible evidence, which, under the jurisprudence, is privileged to the state.77 For
the same reason the court held counsel had no right to discover the
composite picture of the rapist drawn on the night of his first attack.
If produced, this picture would have enabled defense counsel to assess
the likelihood of taint by comparing defendant to the picture.
The holding of the Edgecombe case on the photographs point
appears harsh, especially since counsel was only doing his best to
protect defendant's constitutional rights. The case seems to limit
significantly the opportunity to contest the fairness of pretrial photographic identification-at least the holding will affect the timing of
such a challenge, requiring the issue to be raised at trial and not
before." Finally, unless given a narrower reading, the case would
seem to impair defense counsel's ability to determine whether to try
to impeach the victim's identification at trial by showing it derives
from an unfair photographic display. While it is true that the court
decided the victim's courtroom identification of defendant was independent of her photographic identification, the testimony on this
point quoted by the court in the opinion is that the victim was posi76. There is, a thoughtful note on criminal discovery in Louisiana which makes
this very point in ABA Minimum Standardsfor CriminalJustice-A Student Symposium, 33 LA. L. RFv. 602, 610 (1973).
77. Accord, State v. Frezal, 278 So. 2d 64 (La. 1973), in which defense counsel
requested pretrial disclosure of when, where, and under what circumstances the defendant was identified and by whom. The supreme court held that this information is not
discoverable in Louisiana because it is part of the evidence relied upon by the state
for conviction.
78. But so confining defense counsel may only force him "to probe in the dark in
an attempt to discover and reveal unfairness, while bolstering the government witness'
courtroom identification by bringing out and dwelling upon his prior identification."
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). It would be much fairer in the writer's
view to allow defense counsel to raise the issue at a pretrial hearing. This is the view
of the federal courts. See United States v. Cranston, 453 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1971).
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tive the defendant was her attacker.79 But whether she was positive
because of the photographic showup and not in spite of it, does not
appear.""
After Edgecombe an interesting question is whether the holding
last term in State v. Wilkerson" still applies on motions to suppress
identification testimony when the claim is that the prosecution rests
entirely on an unfair photographic identification. It seems inconsistent for the court to close off discovery of photographs used for pretrial
identification while at the same time impliedly approving pretrial
motions to suppress unfair photographic displays and derivative
identification testimony. Yet the court has done just that. No doubt
sometime soon the court will have to choose which line it prefers. In
the meantime Edgecombe will probably result in nudging defense
counsel to the curious position of having to move for suppression of
photographic identification testimony without knowing whether any
such identifications occurred-hardly a rational situation. It would
make more sense to hold the defense is entitled to know in advance
of trial whether any witnesses identified defendant from his photograph during the investigative stage. 2 If so, the defense should have
access to any photographs shown to the witness in order to decide
whether to file a motion to suppress. 3 All of this means, of course,
that the writer thinks Edgecombe is wrong and should be overruled.
But then this writer favors a fair measure of pretrial discovery, especially when necessary to justly adjudicate constitutional claims.
While the Louisiana supreme court is moving in that direction, it has
not as yet gone very far. In the future in order to avoid what happened in Edgecombe, whenever the claim is that defendant's identification flows directly and without attenuation of the taint from an
79. State v. Edgecombe, 275 So. 2d 740, 744 (La. 1973).
80. Cf. People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d 860 (1970), where the
identifying witness testified that he was sure defendant was the right man. But when
asked why he was so sure, the witness responded: "I said it before and I'll probably
say it again- that's the fellow they had down at the police station."
81. 261 La. 342, 259 So. 2d 871 (1972).
82. Contra, State v. Frezal, 278 So. 2d 64 (La. 1973).
83. Discovery of photographs used to identify defendant is available in the federal
courts under FED. R. CanM. P. 16(b). See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 388
(1968); United States v. Cranston, 453 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Barber, 296 F. Supp. 795, 297 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1969). An inquiry into the facts
and circumstances of the pretrial photographic identification is available at a suppression hearing, and a "reasonable assertion of possible taint" is required on motion to
suppress. United States v. Ash, 93 S. Ct. 2568 (1973). See Haskins v. United States,
433 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir.
1970); United States v. Allison, 414 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1969).
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unfair pretrial confrontation, defense counsel should file a motion to
suppress identification testimony before trial. This would have the
beneficial effect of flushing out defendant's identification claim at an
early stage; it would also mean freeing up the trial judge from the
pressures of trial, making possible closer scrutiny of the pretrial confrontation procedures used and the issue of independent source would
also stand on its own footing. Too frequently, if defense counsel
waits-or worse yet if he is forced-to broach the subject of taint on
cross-examination of an eyewitness at trial, the question never receives the studied attention it deserves.8 4 Ideally, the matter should
be raised on pretrial motion to suppress and the supreme court should
do whatever it can to move Louisiana's criminal procedure in that
direction. Finally, because fair identification of the defendant is such
an important element of proof of guilt, bifurcation of the hearing on
this account seems worth the price."5
III.

CHARGING THE CRIME

Charging the crime would seem an easy task. Just tell defendant
what it is the state says he did and when. Moreover, the fundamental
idea that defendant is entitled to be "informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him" 8 is not hard to understand;
without notice of the alleged offense, the accused is hardly in a position to meet the charge. So we have the root principle, and we think
we understand its rationale. And by itself article 464 looks clear
enough: "The indictment shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
84. And there is the real problem that if defense counsel is forced to raise the issue
of taint late in the proceeding at the trial itself, he may forego the opportunity for fear
of only bolstering the state witness' courtroom identification by bringing out and
dwelling on the earlier pretrial identification. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967).

85. Nothing in Louisiana's Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes a motion to
suppress identification testimony. But the supreme court last term in State v. Wilkerson, 261 La. 342, 259 So. 2d 871 (1972), approved the practice by reasoning from the
analogy of article 703 and on the basis of the court's general supervisory authority over
Louisiana's criminal procedure spelled out in article 3 of the Code. And the court
should go further. It should apply the same common sense approach evident in
Wilkerson to hold that defense counsel is entitled to notice of any pretrial identifications of defendant involved in the case, whether by photograph, showups, or line-up.
This time article 768 provides the relevant analogy. Such a notice, if required, would
score an interest in rationality and open play, not gamesmanship, across the face of
Louisiana's criminal procedure. But see State v. Frezal, 278 So. 2d 64 (La. 1973).
86. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
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charged."' 7 But the law on charging the crime in Louisiana is not that
simple. The Code spends over twenty other articles trying to specify
just how a district attorney is supposed to write up the accusation.
For instance, is an information which charges armed robbery and
alleges defendant "robbed City National Bank at 7415 Airline Highway, Baton Rouge, while armed with a dangerous weapon""8 good?
One would think so. At least a stranger to Louisiana's criminal procedure would guess that way. True, armed robbery requires the use of
force against the person, and the information as drawn speaks only
of robbing a building. Strictly speaking, then, the information is
defective because it should also name the personnel of the bank who
were robbed and put in fear. Still, the idea of "robbing a bank"
suggests a stick-up, and usually somebody will be put in fear. Why
not regard the word "bank" in its figurative sense to mean "personnel
of the City National Bank." This would save the information. At any
rate, if defendant really has no idea what the charge means, he can
always challenge it at trial by moving to amend or to quash the
accusation; and a stranger to Louisiana, reading article 484 of the
Code, would think this state's bill of particulars practice a fair answer
to any claim of prejudice in the case. Defense counsel can easily
obtain the specifics of the charge through a bill of particulars.
Our outsider would have guessed wrong, however. Twice this
term the supreme court reversed convictions for armed robbery because the charge failed to allege that a person was robbed." In each
case the information was defective because it charged armed robbery
of a building, which is no offense at all as such, and the court refused
to equate robbing a bank with robbing the bank's personnel. Justices
Hamlin, Sanders, and Summers dissented from what they regarded
as the court's "hypertechnical ruling." 0
To the writer, who is new in this state, the law on charging the
crime in Louisiana is disappointing. To reverse a criminal conviction
because of a defect in the form of the indictment looks too much like
the folly of common law pleading 8 -at least to this common law
lawyer it does. What especially irks the writer is the rule requiring
reversal of defendant's conviction notwithstanding complete disregard of the indictment's defect at trial. This rule is unfair to the
87. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 464,
88. See State v. Smith, 275 So. 2d 733 (La. 1973).
89. State v. Williams, 275 So. 2d 738 (La. 1973); State v. Smith, 275 So. 2d 733
(La. 1973).
90. State v. Smith, 275 So. 2d 733, 734 (La. 1973) (dissenting opinion, Sanders,

9J.).

91. See generally R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL, LAW AND PROCEDURE 909-11 (1972).
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prosecution. If something is wrong with the indictment or information, defense counsel should be required to raise the matter at trial
in order to give the prosecution a chance to amend. Otherwise defendant goes to trial hoping for acquittal while taking no risk of conviction. Any verdict against him could be set aside on appeal. The better
rule would hold that failure to challenge the defect at trial waives it,
provided defendant has actual notice of the crime charged and the
defense is not prejudiced by the indictment's flaw.9 2 This approach
9" which was also
would change the result in cases like State v. Parrish,
decided during the survey period. In that case the written indictment
was perfect in every respect, but it was orally amended at the instance of defense counsel at the start of trial. Thereafter the state
adduced evidence supporting the amended charge and defendant was
convicted. Clearly, Chief Justice Hamlin's dissent in the case is right
in saying defendant was completely informed of the nature of the
accusation against him; 94 he knew exactly what the state was going
to try to prove. Moreover, defense counsel did not request a bill of
particulars in the case. Why should he; counsel also knew what the
specifics of the charge against his client were. In these circumstances
what sense does it make to reverse defendant's conviction? At least
the judgment in Parrish seems unrelated to the root principle involved. To the writer, the requirement that the accusation be in
writing is not a technicality; nor is it hypertechnical to insist that the
state specifically allege the name of the victim if the charge is armed
robbery. These are indeed requirements of substance which the law
should strictly enforce. But at the same time, enforcement after
conviction is too late. The real technicality in these cases is not the
requirement of fair notice, but the reversal itself, coming as it does
at the last appellate minute, and often on the supreme court's own
account.15 The real irrationality here is allowing defendant to ignore
the procedures the Code specifically sets up to flush these problems
out earlier at trial. This is more gaming than good criminal procedure, with defendant holding the joker.
But law is law, especially if we are talking about Louisiana's
Constitution; and Justice Tate's concurring opinion in State v.
92. Apparently Justice Tate would hold the same way if the court were willing to
overrule the prior jurisprudence. See State v. Smith, 275 So. 2d 733, 736 (La. 1973)
(concurring opinion).
93. 272 So. 2d 321 (La. 1973).
94. Id. at 326 (dissenting opinion).
95. The reversals in both State v. Smith, 275 So. 2d 733 (La. 1973), and State v.
Williams, 275 So. 2d 738 (La. 1973) were ex proprio motu, that is, on the court's own
account, without the matter having been raised by counsel.
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Smith" would tell our stranger that we are. There is a long line of
firmly settled jurisprudence construing Article I, § 10 to require reversal instanter if the indictment or information is constitutionally
invalid, and the indictment is not saved if the facts of the charge are
supplemented by a bill of particulars or are revealed at trial; nor is
the defect waived by the accused going to trial without objection.
Thus for Justice Tate, to affirm in a case like Smith would require
the court to abdicate its judicial function, unless, of course, the court
were willing to re-examine this entire body of jurisprudence and to
overrule it. "[Uintil such is done we cannot ignore this body of
settled law." 7 Then Justice Tate said something very important:
Criminal procedure should, like in fact our civil procedure
does, serve the purpose only of advancing decision of issues on
their merits, not afford the basis for decision on the happenstance
that certain words were or were not used by lawyers in pleadings.
As Article 5051 of our Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides,
rules of procedure implement the substantive law and are
not an end in themselves.'"
This writer would add a comparative note of his own. In sniffing out
the civil law tradition for the first time, our stranger would no doubt
discover the hallmark idea that in the civil law root principle, not
procedure, is center-stage. 9 A true civilian would never allow the
common law's fetish for form to control judgment on the merits.
Perhaps this is why Henry George McMahon put article 5051 into our
Code of Civil Procedure, and it is not too late for the supreme court
to put the idea back into our criminal procedure as well. Justice
Tate's suggestion is a good one. The law on charging the crime in
Louisiana should change-as part of the renaissance.10° But more
than that, if the court is ever willing to look at the idea of fair notice
from the perspective of principle and not technicality, then by working through the notice idea the court could very well shape a plan of
discovery rights for the criminally accused in Louisiana. This is true
96. 275 So. 2d 733, 734-37 (La. 1973) (concurring opinion).
97. Id. at 736.
98. Id.
99. 1 owe my first introduction to my colleague, Professor Pascal. He makes the
point about the subservience of procedure in the civil law in his review of Ren6 David's
hook FHiiNCII LAW. See Pascal, Book Review, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 609, 611 (1973).
100. See Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, 33 LA.
]L.REV. 357 (1973). It seems ironic that the Louisiana supreme court should continue
to insist on technical perfection in charging the crime, when criminal procedure elsewhere in common law jurisdictions has long since left that fetish behind. See R.
P iEKINK, CRIMINAl. LAW AND PROCEDURE 911

(1972).
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because Article I, § 10 of Louisiana's Constitution could be read
generatively, that is, there is no principled reason for confining the
notice idea to written indictments, bills of particulars, and opening
statements. These devices may tell the accused too little, too late.
Accordingly, a new means of disclosure earlier in the prosecution may
be required, and from the cases it appears that Louisiana has already
begun to inch in just that direction.
IV.

PRETRIAL DISCOVERY

Last year an important question for the criminal proceduralist
'
carried criminal discovery in
was just how far State v. Migliore""
the case as a limited breakcharacterized
Pugh
Professor
Louisiana.
through in the right direction.' 0 2 Migliore held that if the offense
charged is possession or sale of a prohibited substance, then defendant can have a small amount of the drug for independent, pretrial
inspection. But the opinion in the case is very guarded; the justices
were not "adjudicat[ing] generally-to the extent that prior jurisprudence would be overruled-on a matter which might be considered by the Legislature at a future date."'' 3 Justice Summers, who
dissented in Migliore, foresaw a different result:
The Court's ruling today opens wide the door to pretrial
discovery in criminal cases. This result must follow for we shall
find it impossible to rationally distinguish this factual situation
from the numberless fact situations future cases will present. 04
However it is fair to say that the path of the law on discovery this
year indicates Justice Summers' prediction was wrong. Maybe, that
is. At any rate, there are some interesting developments along the
way.
First, immediately after Migliore defense counsel attempted to
prove Justice Summers right, and at least on principle it is hard to
distinguish between the discovery allowed in Migliore and discovery
of the broken broom handle and bloody rag which defendant claimed
would support his plea of self-defense in State v. Lee. "' In the Lee
case the state kept the broom handle and rag for five months without
performing finger print or blood tests on these items. After another
101. 261 La. 722, 260 So. 2d 682 (1972).
102. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term-Evidence, 33 LA. L. REv. 306, 322 (1973).
103. State v. Migliore 261 La. 722, 742, 260 So. 2d 682, 689 (1972).
104. Id. at 744-45, 260 So. 2d at 690 (dissenting opinion).
105. 270 So. 2d 544 (La. 1973).
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month, tests were finally run at the insistence of court-appointed
counsel, but these were negative because of "deterioration" of the
items during their long stay in the evidence room. The supreme court
affirmed Lee's conviction for manslaughter, rejecting his argument
that what happened amounted to suppression of evidence favorable
to him. The items themselves were in fact admitted at the trial, and
the court could not see how the verdict would have dropped below
manslaughter even if tests had been run and the results put before
the jury."" Justice Barham dissented on the theory that storing away
evidence which might prove exculpatory for a long period of time
without scientific testing is tantamount to destruction of the evidence." 7
On the merits in Lee, this writer tends to agree with Justice
Barham's dissent. But regardless of how one comes out on the Brady
claim""s raised in the case, Lee is important because it intimates that
discovery lies if the evidence sought could possibly support a plea of
self-defense. This would indeed be an extension of criminal discovery
in Louisiana because the disclosure in the Migliore case, if in the
accused's favor, would itself prove defendant innocent. But in cases
like Lee production would only tend to support the defense; favorable
discovery would not in and of itself end the whole prosecution.
Whether the court allows discovery on the claim that production will
facilitate proof of self-defense remains to be seen; at least there is no
holding on that question one way or the other this term. The issue
was not squarely before the court in Lee because defendant's retained
counsel, who had been on the case earlier, had not requested discovery. But very subtly, in a footnote, the justices may have given us an
intimation of their feelings: "However, there is nothing in the record
to preclude that the opportunity did not exist for either of these
[retained] counsel to have requested an examination of these
items."" 9 Why mention an opportunity if it does not exist?
Other cases this year suggest just the opposite, however. In State
v. Gibson,""the court reiterated that in Louisiana defense counsel are
not entitled to discover what weapons were used in the alleged offense
or anything about their ownership. Presumably counsel wanted this
information in support of a plea of self-defense, but the court turned
him down. Nothing was said about the effect of Migliore.
About six months after Migliore was decided the court adhered
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 546.
Id. at 547. (dissenting opinion).
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
State v. Lee, 270 So. 2d 544, 545 n.* (La. 1973).
271 So. 2d 868 (La. 1973).
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firmly to its view that there is no general right of criminal discovery
in Louisiana; Migliore applies only if the case involves "possession of
a substance which is criminal merely by virtue of its chemical composition." This was in State v. Jones,"Iand after about six months more
of repeated attempts on the part of defense lawyers to win broader
discovery rights, the supreme court, obviously exasperated by all of
this, declared: "'[We] fail to understand why defense counsel continue to present such arguments to us on appeal.' " In fairness to
the defense bar, however, it could hardly have done otherwise; good
advocacy required defense counsel at least to try to outrun Migliore's
facts toward applying its rationale instead. But a majority of the
justices would have none of it.
Finally, State v. Edgecombel" is this term's last considered word
The case expressly holds that Migliore has no life of its
discovery.
on
narrow facts. It is fitting that Chief Justice Hamlin
its
own beyond
should have this year's last word on the important subject of criminal
discovery. Not only did he retire this year, but also, and this is
equally important, Chief Justice Hamlin wrote Migliore for the court
a full year before. The cases in the interim suggest that he was wise
to remit the question of discovery to the Legislature and to the agencies of general law revision in Louisiana."' Piecemeal adjudication,
unless absolutely necessary, hardly seems a sound way to fashion the
rational, fair-minded plan of criminal discovery that this state needs.
If the matter were ultimately left to the adversary system with only
one lawyer on a side, a thorough articulation of all the interests at
stake and a reasoned judgment on the question would appear more
difficult." 5
111. 263 La. 164, 267 So. 2d 559 (1972).
112. State v. Rose, 271 So. 2d 863, 866 (La. 1973), citing State v. Haddad, 221
La. 337, 344, 59 So. 2d 411, 414 (1952) (in which the supreme court had said the same
thing over 20 years ago).
11:1. 275 So. 2d 740 (La. 1973).
114. In Migliore Chief Justice Hamlin expressly noted that discovery is a subject
on which the legislature might act at a near future date. See State v. Migliore, 261
La. 722, 742, 260 So. 2d 682, 689 (1972).
115. The intervention of the Orleans Parish District Attorney in the Migliorecase
itself supports this point. See Id. at 726, 727, 260 So. 2d at 683-84. He was confronted
with the overwhelming task of representing all the interests opposed to broader discovery rights in Louisiana criminal cases, and he had to present his arguments in the
context of a single case, which was probably only one of a hundred waiting on his
schedule. The question of discovery in criminal cases is a delicate one, with wide
ramifications and important interests on both sides of the issue. See generally Rezneck,
Justice Brennan and Discovery in Criminal Cases, 4 RUTGERS CAM. L.J. 85 (1972).
What is the appropriate scope of criminal discovery, and to what extent should discovery be a reciprocal affair, with defendant tendering his side too? Answers are not easy,
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particularly if they have to come in the context of adjudication, as in Migliore. The
rulemaking procedures of the legislative setting would seem a more appropriate forum
in which to fashion a reasoned discovery plan for criminal cases. See generally Shapiro,
The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).

